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ST A TE~IENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an aetion brought by the plaintiff corporation 
against G0org-e Anderson, the president of Select Cars, 
Ine., a Ftah corporation, based on the theory that the 
saill George Anderson guaranteed by written instrument 
to pa!· any obligations of the defendant, Select Cars, Inc., 
o\\·ed t0 the plaintiff. 
The plaintiff's claim is based upon a written instru-
IDP11t "·hieh the Distriet Court construed to be the per-
sonal guarantee of the defendant, George Anderson, to 
pay the debts of the corporation. 
1 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Upon the trial of the case the lower court construed 
the affidavit introduced by the plaintiff as Exhibit P-1 
as a written guarantee by the president of the corpora-
tion to pay the debt of the corporation owed to the plain-
tiff. The lower court also granted the plaintiff attor-
neys' fees based upon a clause in the promissory notes 
executed by the defendant corporation, Select Cars, Inc. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The appellant, George Anderson, seeks to haYe t]J(' 
judgment of the trial court reversed and the complaint 
as against him dismissed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On or a bout July 24, 1964, the plain tiff and the de-
fendant, Select Cars, Inc., entered into a floor planning-
arrangment under the terms of which the plaintiff finnnce 
company agreed to finance a floor plan for Select C'<lrs. 
Inc. 
Coincident with this plan the plaintiff, Select Can, 
Inc., executed an affidai;·it for the pnrpose of authorizin!2: 
Tony Chapman, one of the officers of Select Cars. Inc., to 
bind the corporation in connection with mortgage notes 
on automobiles to be floored with the plaintiff. The 110-
davit on its face recites that the corporation agrers to hr 
bound by the signature of Tony Chapman and cont;;ins a 
speciman signature of the said Tony Chapman. Suhst'-
2 
quently the said Tony Chapman on behalf of the corpo-
ration, Select Cars, Inc., executed a series of promissory 
notes with the plaintiff in connection with the floor plan-
11ing arrangement. Each of said notes was in the name 
of the corporation only and containerl no personal guar-
nntres by the officers of the corporation. No personal 
"n:uantee of any kind was eYer executed by the defend-
-~ . . 
ants, George Anderson or Tony Chapman, and the plain-
tiff relies solely upon the affidaYit introduced as Exhibit 
P-1 wl1ich it contends constitutes a personal guarantee 
hy George Anderson, indiYiduaUy, and Tony Chapman, 
to ra:· the dehts of the corporation. 
ARGUl\TEN'T 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN PERMIT-
TING PAROL EVIDENCE TO BE CONSID-
ERED FOR PURPOSES OF MODIFYING OR 
REFOR~IING THE C 0 N T RA C T UPON 
"WHiCH THE PLAI~TIFF HAS BROUGHT 
ITS ACTION. 
It is well settled taw in this state and in most juris-
dictions that the courts in construing an agreement will 
not add to or modify the terms of the instrument unless 
the instrument is so ambiguous that it requir0s the 
introduction of evidence for the purpose of understand-
ing what the words of the instrument mean. The court 
will not go heyond the four corners of the instrument 
unless the instrume11t is so ambiguous that the language 
rannot he interpreted. Trintlc Y. r·tah Idaho 811qar ('om-
;~ 
pany, 73 U. 215, 278 P. 312, Armstrong Y. Larson, jj 1T. 
327, 186 P. 97, Mal/'lti City Saz,ings Bank Y. P('f('rs 011 
' 
33 U. 209, 93 P. 566. 
This rule has been termed by the courts not to he n 
rule of evidence at all hut a rule of suhstantiYr law and 
the reason for this is obvious. If thiR rule did not con-
trol then no contract would he any more certain than thr 
oral testimony of the individuals party to such contract 
and their witnesses. 
There is perhaps no principal more important to 
the stability of commercial transactions and the relation" 
of people in modern society than the principal that the 
parties to an instrument must be held to the terms of thr 
writing and cannot be heard to say that the~' intrn(led 
some other legal effect than that expressed in the writ-
ing. In .Jensen's Used Cars v . .James T. RirP, 7 F.~rl 
276, 323 P. 2d 259 the Supreme Court of the State of 
Utah considered an almost identical situation ·with thr 
facts involved in this appeal. In that case the plaintiff 
sued the defendant on an automobile purchase contract 
and the d0fendant contende<l that tlw contrad di<1 not 
express the true arrangement made lwtwPen the parties 
and introduced evidence as to what the true agrerment 
was. The Utah Supreme Court, in holding that the par-
ties, regardless of their intent, must he held to the trrms 
of the agreement aR written, stated the rule as follows: 
"Elementary it is that in construing con-
tracts we seek to determine the intention of the 
parties. But it is also elementary and of extreme 
practical importance that we hold contracting par-
ties to their fair and understandable language de-
liberately committed to writing and f'ndorRe<l hy 
4 
them as signatories thereto. "Were this not so busi-
ness, one with another among our citizens, \vould he 
rclpgated to the clrnotic, f'nd the hasic purpose of 
the law to supply enforcPahlc rules of conduct 
for the maintenance and improvement of an or-
derly society's welfare and progTPss would find 
itself impotent. Tt is nnt mir0[1sonahle to hold 
one rnsnonsihl" for lan<.,'1lf1Vf> '·'·hich h" J1imc:eH' 
rspouses. Snch language is the only implement 
hP dn•s us tn fashion a <i.etrrmination as tn thP 
intentions of the narties. • • • The rule excluding 
matters outside thr four corners of a clear, un-
derstandahlP document. is a fair one, and ones 
contentions concerning his intent should extend 
no further than his own clear expressions. 
It was urged correctly that to admit matters 
ontsidP a contract wonlcl do violence to the prin-
cipal that one is hound by his manifestations of 
assent, and that, irrespective of such contention, 
snf'h matters proner]Y are Pxclndah}e hy the nar0l 
evidence rule - which nlle, counsel suggests, is 
0ne of snhstanti\·p ]aw rather than one of evi-
dPnce. ''l1aten•r kind one ralls it, the rule 
that excludes such evidence is a common sense 
rule.'' p. 260-261. 
The contract construed by the trial court can by no 
possihlP interpretation he considered to be a guarantee 
hy thP officers of Select Cars, Inc., that they would pay 
the dehts of the corporation and ~vet the trial court con-
siderPd testimony that prior to the execution of the 
ngTePmPnt the partiPs agreed that the defendant, Geor.ge 
Anderson, would be a guarantor of the corporate debt 
and that the agreement was executed in furtherance of 
this understanding. The exact language and contents of 
the agreement is as follows : 
AFFIDAVIT 
This is to certify that the undersigned George 
Anderson is conducting a U secl Car Business at 
2580 South Main, Salt Lake City, Utah, under the 
name of Select Cars, Inc., which business and the 
primary assets and business license thereof, stand 
in the name of Select Cars, Inc. In consideration 
for the Salt Lake .Auto Auction and Brasher ]\fo_ 
tor and Finance Co., Inc,. dealing with the under-
signed in connection with said business, I herelw 
authorize Tony Chapman to sign any drafts, co~­
tracts or documents on behalf of said business 
and hereby jointly and separately agree that each 
and both of us shall he hound b~T the sig·natnre of 
either of us in connection ,\·ith such transaction. 
/s/ George Anderson, Pres. 
George Anderson 
SELECT CARS, I NC. 
Dated this 24 day of July, 1964, at Salt Lake City. 
Subscribed and sworn to hefore me this 24 day 
of July, 1964. 
/s/ Myron W. Horne 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
My commission expires Aug. 7, 1965. 
The following is a specimen signature of Tony 
Chapman 
/s/ Tony Chapman 
Tony Chapman 
Subscribed and sworn to hefore me this -·--···-·· 
day of July, 1964. 
XoTARY PPnLrc 
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The defendant testified that Exhibit 6-D was the 
original proposed draft of the affidavit prepared by the 
plaintiff finance corporation's officer, Myron D. Horne, 
and that he objected to the language of the affidavit, 
pointing out that Select Cars, Inc., was a corporation 
and that it was not his personal business. He further 
testified that the plaintiff's officer, Myron W. Horne, 
then inserted the words "Inc." after the words "Select 
Gars" and struck out the name "George Anderson" and 
inserted ''Select Cars'' in his O\Yn handwriting. (R. pp. 
81-82) The plaintiff then redrafted the affidavit into the 
form which was finally executed (Exhibit P-1). In this 
document there is no reference to George Anderson in-
di,,idnally at all. 
The plaintiff's president, present at the meeting at 
,\'11ich the agreement (Exhibit P-1) was prepared and 
executed in the plaintiff's offices, testified that the plain-
tiff finance company had been in business for twenty 
years, its principal business being floor planning credit 
for automohiles (R. p. 60). It is difficult to conceive of 
a finance company that has not prepared personal guar-
antPes for the signature of individuals seeking credit on 
hehalf of a corporation and that if they intended the 
afficlaYit to be the personal guarantee of George Ander-
son and Tony Chapman that they would have prepared it 
in the form of Exhihit P-1. If the affidavit did not in 
fact set forth the terms of the agreement as made, then 
the remPdy of the plaintiff is to seek reformation of the 
rontract. The plaintiff has not sought reformation of 
the contract in this action but has sued on the affidavit, 
alleging that the affidavit is a contract obligating George 
7 
Anderson and Tony Chapman to pay the obligations of 
the corporation. 
The affidavit recites that the business and primary 
assets of the business are in the name of Select Cars 
' 
Inc., and that in consideration for the Salt Lake Auto 
Auction and Brasher l\fotor and Finance Company, Inc., 
dealing with the corporation in connection with said busi-
ness Tony Chapman is authorized to sign drafts, con-
tracts or documents on behalf of the business. The affi-
daYit at the bottom contains a specimen signature of 
Tony Chapman and the affidaYit is signed by Select Cars. 
Inc., George Anderson, Pres. There is nothing amliig-
nous about the document. It is perfectly apparent that 
the document was intended to be an authorization for 
Tony Chapman to sign notes and contracts ineident to 
the operation of the business of which Mr. Chapman wn.~ 
the manager. It will be noted that on all of the notes 
the notes are signed by the corporation only and that 
the notes do not purport to bind either l\fr. Chapman or 
l\fr. Anderson indiYidually. The testimony giYen hy -:'if r. 
Anderson to the effect that the purport and intent of 
the affidavit was simply to proYide an authority for Tony 
Chapman to bind the corporation is the only reascnahlr 
construction that can be placed on the document. To 
permit the plaintiff to seek reconry against l\Ir. Chap-
man and Mr. Anderson on the theory that prior to the 
signing of the affidm·it it was agreed that they or either 
of them would be individually liable would he to <'om-
pletely re-write the agreement between the parties. ·whe1~ 
wf' consider that the plaintiff drafted the agreement and 
it, therefore, should he constructed against the plaintiff, 
8 
and that the plaintiff is a finance company having con-
ducted this type of business for twenty years, it is incon-
ceivable that they could have believed that this docu-
ment constituted a guarantee hy Anderson and Chapman 
of the corporate deht. The trial court in so holding has 
completely re-written the agreement between the parties 
and has reformed the contract to entirely change the lan-
guage adopted by the parties in reaching its decision. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING 
ANY ATTORNEYS' FEES SINCE NO EVI-
DENCE WAS EVEN OFFERED IN CONNEC-
TION WITH THIS CLAIM. 
The plaintiff claims to be entitled to its attorneys' 
fees in connection with this action. There was no evi-
dence introduced at the trial by the plaintiff in support 
of this contention and notwithstanding this the court 
granted the plaintiff a judgment for attorneys' fees 
against the defendant corporation and its president, 
George Anderson, in the amount of $622.93. Title 78-37-9, 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, provides: 
"Attorney's Fees: In all cases of foreclosures, 
when an attorney's fee is claimed by the plaintiff, 
the amount thereof shall be fixed by the Court, 
any stipulation to the contrary notwithstanding; 
provided no other or greater amount shall be al-
lowed or decreed than the sum which shall appear 
by the evidence to be actually charged by and to be 
paid to the attorney for the plaintiff. (Emphasis 
supplied) 
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The foregoing statute limits the recovery of attor. 
neys' fees to the amount shown by the evidence of the 
plaintiff and in this case the plaintiff offered no evidence 
whatever and is, therefore, not entitled to any juclgment 
for attorneys' fees. 
CONCLUSION 
The court erred in holding the defendant, George 
Anderson, liable for the dehts of the corporation, ~elect 
Cars, Inc., since the written agreement hetween the par-
ties does not so provide. 
The court also erred in granting attorneys' fees to 
the plaintiff since the plaintiff offered no evidence what-
ever to sustain such an award. 
Respectfully submitted, 
GORDON I. HYDE 
555 East 4th South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
10 
Attorney for Defenda11ts 
and Appella,nts 
